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THE RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS.
[Opening Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association.)
In some respects economic science is now at the height of
its prosperity. At no previous period has popular interest in
the subject been so widespread. Our college classrooms are
thronged with its students. Teachers in our secondary schools
are striving to find a place for it in their curricula. For uni-
versity extension lecturers in this domain the demand far out-
runs the supply. Editors of all our leading journals seek for
writers educated in political economy. Large business corpo-
rations demand expert statisticians for aid in the solution of
their most difficult problems. In education, in journalism, or
in finance, the trained economist to-day finds a great and grow-
ing demand for his services.
But in one vital respect the conditions are far less satisfac-
tory. The influence of our economists on government and
legislation is not only less than it should be to-day, but less
than it many times has been in the past. Our practical politi-
cians-" and by practical politics we do not mean foul politics -
have an ill-concealed contempt for a class of men whom they
regard as theorists and visionaries. In individual cases, they
sometimes ask the advice of economists, and-more rarely-
take it; but they are far from having the habit of asking or
taking such advice as an incident to the working of govern-
ment machinery. The application of civil service examinations
as a means of filling administrative offices has not meided
matters in this respect. Rather has it emphasized the lack of
influence of economic science on governmental practice; for
it has filled our public service with men technically trained in
other branches of knowledge rather than that which we repre-
sent. I am not, indeed, unmindful of the valuable work which
has been done and is being done by members of this associa-
tion, on problems of currency and taxation, on price statistics,
on railroad statistics, and other matters of public moment.
But the very excellence of this work only emphasizes the con-
trast between the subordinate position and precarious influence
which is to-day accorded them, and the commanding places
attained by economists of the earlier generation. Where can
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we find among our younger men those who are succeeding to
the inheritance of Walker and-Wells, of Charles Francis Adams
and Horace White? One of these economists was given scope for
his powers as superintendent of the census; another, as com-
missioner of the revenue. The record of their work has passed
into history; it is a history of scientific study and practical
influence combined, which reads almost like romance when
contrasted with some of the administrative methods of the
present day. The third of these men, as a Masiachusetts
public official, created a system of railroad legislation which,
whatever its deficiencies, has nevertheless left its impress on
the law of two continents; the fourth has proved himself the
mightiest champion of the cause of sound public finance in the
country, and has made the journal which he edits second to
none in the world as a power for influencing public opinion and
public action. Where shall we look for their successors? We
are teaching more about the theory of utility than did our
fathers, but are we doing so much for the realization of that
theory in the organized life of the nation?
If we fail in our influence upon public life we fail in what
is the most important application of our studies, and what may
almost be said to constitute their fundamental reason for exist-
ence. Even if such failure represent but a passing phase, as I
believe it does, it is nevertheless a most serious matter for con-
sideration. Let us strive to-night, if we may, to get some light
on this loss of economic influence. Let us see why economics
and politics have grown apart in the immediate past, and con-
sider whether there is any hope for their reunion in the imme.
diate future.
It is hardly necessary to say that the conception of economic
theory has fluctuated widely from age to age, and that the
sphere of economic study has altered correspondingly. Going
back in the history of this science, as we must in so niany oth-
ers, to Aristotle, we find that in his mind the relations between
economics and politics were simple. Economics meant to him
the art of ordering the affairs of a household, politics the art of
ordering the affairs of a state. Each had its own clearly
defined field of enquiry. The two subjects had indeed points
of similarity; a man who was familiar with- the one was
better prepared thereby to deal with the other; but fundamen-
tally their spheres were as distinct as those of geography and
astronomy. As a Plart, and a subordinate part, of the science of
economics, Aristotle was forced to notice the more unworthy sci-
ence, or rather art of chrematistics,-the science or art of making
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money. It is notorious that Aristotle looked upon this part of
the subject with disapproval. His idea of business was like
that of Mr. Caleb Garth in Middlemarch, to whom it "never
meant money transactions, but the skillful application of labor.'
But in the minds of Aristotle's successors the subject of money
and money-making assumed constantly increasing importance
in the study of private economy. This was in fact an almost
necessary consequence of substituting the labor of freemen for
the labor -of slaves. If the householder was able to obtain
labor by physical compulsion he could despise money and all
things connected therewith; but if he had to buy his labor he
was forced to pay attention to the means of buying it. Thomas
Aquinas had no more love for money-getting than did Aristotle,
but the social conditions of the time of Thomas Aquinas ren-
dered it necessary to take more account of money-getting than
did the social conditions of the time of Aristotle. It was also
gradually seen that money economy formed a better means
of public service than the older system of slave labor. Not
only did a wage system substitute itself for a system of com-
pulsory or customary services, but even the taking of inter-
est, at first unreasonably condemned, was afterward toler-
ated and ultimately defended by publicists. In the middle
of the seventeenth century the term economy had come to be
associated almost exclusively with the work of money-getting.
More than this, the principles of chrematistics, or of economy
in its modern sense, were applied to the conduct of public
affairs, and gave rise to the study of political economy, in which
ideas derived from the study of private business were applied to
the work of the statesman. The cameralists applied the meth-
ods of domestic economy to matters of public finance-the
conduct of the business affairs of the government. The
mercantilists went yet farther, and tried to apply these same
methods by legislation to the affairs of the whole people as
well as of the government itself. In other words, they pro-
claimed the duty of the statesman to assist his people as well
as his government in making money. At the end of the seven-
teenth century political economy was universally understood
as an attempt to apply the principles of money-getting to
the conduct of national affairs; and with this practice in view
it was assiduously studied by financiers and by statesmen.
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have witnessed a
Teaction. It began with the French school of physiocrats, who
protested against the aims of the mercantilists and combatted
the idea that national wealth could best be subserved by
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national money making; contending that the food of the people
rather than the gold or silver in circulation measured the
national prosperity. It was carried still further by the English
economists of the school of Adam Smith, who criticised the
means adopted by the mercantilists no less than their aims,
and showed how individual freedom conduced to the develop-
ment of public wealth, in many cases at any rate, far more
surely than legislative activity. A new conception of political
economy thus arose, with broader aims and broader founda-
tions than the old. It is not necessary to say to an aud-
ience like this how great was the gain both in scientific truth
and in practical utility. It is perhaps more necessary to point
out some of the dangers which attended the change.
In the first place, there was often a loss of concreteness.
The older political economy expressed its results in pounds,
shillings and pence. They might be true or they might be
false, but they were at any rate in a form where they were capa-
ble of measurement and verification. Not without good cause
did the mercantilists claim for their reasonings the title of polit-
ical arithmetic. We may apply to them the words, at once appre-
ciative and critical, which Bagehot applied to George Cornewall
Lewis: "Of course he was not uniformly right-there were
some kinds of facts which he was by mental constitution not
able wholly to appreciate; and his view of every subject, though
it might not be adequate, was always lucid. His mind was like
a registering machine with a patent index: it took in all the
data, specified, enumerated them, and then indicated with
unmistakable precision what their sum total of effect precisely
was. The index might be wrong; but nobody could ever mis-
take for a moment what it meant and where it was." In this
respect later political economists are at a disadvantage. The
new political economy substituted a vaguer conception of
wealth for the more concrete one, and many of its propositions
suffered a corresponding loss of clearness and precision. The
mercantile school of economists had measured wealth in terms
of money. The first generation of their critics measured it
in terms of food; the second and third generation measured
it as "commodities;" our own generation measures it in terms
of utility. But food is a less definite and tangible measure than
money; commodities are a less definite and tangible measure
than food; and utility is perhaps the least definite and tangible
measure of all. People know exactly how the propositions
of Sir Thomas Mun applied to any concrete case; they knew
approximately how those of Turgot applied; they can make a
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fair guess how those of Ricardo or Mill apply; but of the appli-
cation of those of Sax or Menger they can hardly hazard a con-
jecture.
And in the second place, with this loss of concreteness of
conception came a loss of definiteness of aim; the almost inevi-
table result of substituting the principles of a science for
the practice of an art. This change was hardly noticed in
the first generation, when Turgot and Smith and their follow-
ers were chiefly occupied sweeping away old restrictions; but
when. it became a question of building up rather than of
pulling down the loss was felt very strongly. The old political
economy very often gave wrong advice, but at the very worst it
it was explicit and consistent advice. The new political
economy in its anxiety to avoid error falls into vagueness of
advice, and into apparent if not real inconsistency. For a pre-
sumptuous claim of knowledge it substitutes either controver-
sies or confession of ignorance., "Fools rush in where angels
fear to tread;" but this difference of political method has at
times the disadvantage of lessening the practical influence of
angels upon the affairs of this world. As the art of political
economy gave place to the science of economics it was placed
at an inevitable disadvantage with those who sought for the
easily mastered rules of an art which professed to teach them
what they could do rather than the general principles of a sci-
ence which too often indicated only what they could not do.
This was not the fault of the political economists. It was
their fault, however, that when the problem of securing practi-
cal influence became harder, they did not make more vigorous
efforts to render their points clear to the statesman, but often-
times took refuge in the seclusion of the schools, and there
built up theories of society more interesting and profitable to
the scientist than to the politician. The number of students
who sought their lectures increased this temptation. Instead
of making it a science for statesmen they were led to make it
a science for schoolmen, with all that complex termonology
which Giddings so aptly calls its jargon. In many cases this pro-
cess has gone so far as to make economics a subordinate depart-
ment of psychology rather than politics; a theory of motives
starting from assumptions that are never realized completely
and ending in propositions that can never be verified at all. I
am far* from wishing to cast ridicule on metaphysical methods
of political economy. Cournot and Jevons and the Austrian
school have taught us a great many things that we did not
know before. They have substituted good underlying meta-
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physics for bad underlying metaphysics. But the very excel-
lence of this foundation has tended to divert attention from the
details of the superstructure, which after all are the ones with
which we have to deal in practical life. And I am disposed to
think seriously that the excessive use of psychological terms
and conceptions, to the neglect of purely commercial ones,
has been the most potent cause to weaken the influence of
economists among statesmen and men of the world.
Meantime theories of government and governments them-
selves were in the midst of a process of evolution which
tended to carry them somewhat away from the influence of
economic theory, even if that theory had remained the same.
The judiciary, the legislature and the administration were sub-
ject each of them to separate influences which made them less
ready to rely on the political economist for advice and guid-
ance.
It might be thought that the judiciary, at any rate, would
never have become independent of economic considerations;
for the scientific study of the law has had and still has a close
affiliation with the scientific study of political economy. This
affiliation between economics and jurisprudence is manifest
alike in their data, their methods, and their conclusions. The
fundamental datum of modern economics is property right.
This is also the datum and starting point of a large part of our
legal reasoning. The method of the economist is a combina-
tion of the historical and the deductive. He studies the prece-
dent by which property right has been established on the one
hand, and deduces the consequences arising from such property
rights on the other hand. This combination is also charac-
teristic of the methods of the judiciary; the chief difference
between economists and court being that the economist con-
siders how the individual judgment will act under the given
conditions, while the court considers how the public judgment
will act. But this difference of standpoint ought not to lead to
conflicting or even inharmonious conclusions, for the economist
shows over and over again how freedom of individtial judg-
ment results in collective good, and the judiciary shows with
equal force how the free activity of public judgment in the
pursuit of its own ends leads to the highest mdasure of indi-
vidual good. Finally, the characteristic conclusions and
precepts of the modern political economists are summed up in
the two words "free competition;" and this is no less character-
istically the conclusion and precept of our law courts. In
relying on competition to liberalize commercial practice, econ-
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omists and lawyers have gone hand and hand; sharing in tol-
erably equal measure the glory of habitual success in its appli-
cation, and the odium of occasional error by its misapplication.
But economics and law have to some degree parted com-
pany; not so much in hostility as in indifference, not so much in
denying one another's conclusions as in ignoring them. In the
earlier times economists and jurists were both concerned to
connect their principles with those of political ethics, and each
science was thus brought into vital connection with the other.
But just as economics gradually assumed the character of a science
or discipline by itself, based upon the action of each individual in
deciding what was for his own utility and making this exercise
of individual judgment an absolute fact if not an absolute right;
so jurisprudence at almost the same time became an equally
absolute science based upon the actions of a public will, the
judgments of a sovereign who allowed no control except that
which his own pleasure deigned to impose. This doctrine of
sovereignty as a basis of jurisprudence has a history closely
parallel to that of the doctrine of utility as a basis of econom-
ics. Until the end of the eighteenth century the authority of
the law was based upon the supposition of a social compact.
People obeyed the government because the government ren-
dered certain services to the people. That such a compact or
contract ever existed historically the leading exponents of the
theory did not believe or even pretend to believe. Rousseau
himself explicitly says that it makes no difference with his
social contract theory whether it had any historical basis or
not. It was an assumption used to give vitality and concrete-
ness to the conceptions of that natural justice to which
eighteenth century writers held that law must conform.
Hobbes and Locke and Blackstone and Rousseau, with all their
wide divergences of opinion on individual points, were united
in holding to this theory of a compact. Hobbes might use it to
deny the right of revolution, Locke to prove that same right;
Blackstone might use it as a coniservative force, Rousseau as a
destructive one. But absolutists and revolutionists, conserva-
tive and radical, all had before them the conception of a higher
law of political necessity limiting the actions of the courts,
just as the economists of the same period held to the concep-
tion of public needs and claims as limiting the economic action
of the individual. It was reserved for Bentham to deal -the
death blow to this theory; to show not only that the social com-
pact had no foundation in history-which was an easy enough
task, because nobody really thought it had-but also no foun-
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dation in logic; to insist that so-called natural law was no law
at all; that law was what the courts said, just because the courts
chose to say it and for no other reason whatever. When a cer-
tain court objected to Daniel Webster's logic, "this is not law,"
"It was law until your honor spoke," was the historic reply.
Of the practical gain in clearness of legal decisions result-
ing from the acceptance of the theories of Bentham there can
be no dispute; but it was a gain which has been purchased at a
very serious cost. The courts have been estopped from talking
no small amount of nonsense, but they have also lost no small
part of their educational influence which they had under the
old system. For Bentham may be said to have overthrown a
theory which was historically false and prophetically true, and
substituted one which was historically true and prophetically
false. As a matter of history things have been law, not
because they were just or even logical, but because the courts
enunciated them. But it is safe to prophecy that this state of
things will continue so long as the courts are respected by the
public as being at once just and logical. It is right as well as
convenient for the lawyer to assume that whatever the courts
command will be law; but only because the courts show them-
selves clearer sighted than the body of the nation. The
authority of the English judges, while nominally derived
from the crown, has been practically derived from their
own good sense and progressiveness. A theory which
leads them to rely more on precedent and less on good
sense and progressiveness, while it may prevent the more
commonplace judges from making an exhibition of themselves,
nevertheless offered a serious bar to the development of legal
authority to meet new circumstances and new emergencies,
not to speak of the possibility that it may at times menace the
general respect for the judiciary and general authority of the
law as a whole. As a matter of fact, the courts have made
themselves independent of the help of the economists by with-
drawing from the consideration of. those distinctively modern
problems where precedent furnishes no clear guide for action.
In making the corpus juris clearer and more consistent with
itself, it would seem to a layman as if the courts have some-
times fallen short of meeting the needs of growing industrial
communities. Contrast the rapid progress of English law down
to the middle of the last century in all economic matters, where
judges were among the most enlightened of reformers, with its
extremely slow development in the face of modern conditions.
Take the matter of taxation. Have judicial decisions adapted
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themselves to facts? No. They are based on assumptions as
to the possibility of assessment of personal property which may
have been approximately true in the eighteenth century, but
are totally false in the nineteenth: The courts, while protest-
ing against unequal taxation, nevertheless refuse to look at the
chief practical source of inequality, that source not having
been a thing of great importance a hundred years ago. Or
take the matter of transportation. For a generation and more
our courts insisted on applying to the railroad the precedents
derived from the highway. It is not so very many years since
they refused to enter.upon that most important of all railroad
rate evils, the evil of discrimination; in some instances saying
explicitly that if one man's rate was reasonable in itself it was
irrevelant to inquire whether another man was charged a
lower rate. Such instances of lack of attention to modern facts
might be multiplied indefinitely, but these are enough to show
how the legal theory of sovereignty of the court has had the
same effect as the economic theory of sovereignty of the
individual in separating from one another, and from the needs
of practical politics, two sciences whose best work has been
done hand in hand with each other, and in the most sedulous
application to those needs.
The results of this separation have been so serious that
efforts have been made to reintroduce a connection by means of
"commissions" of various forms-railroad commissions, tax
commissions, labor commissions, and an indefinite number of
others. Such bodies, it is thought, will, like the courts, repre-
sent public opinion; but unlike the courts they will be pos-
sessed of technical knowledge which will enable them to look
forward to the future and not merely backward at the past. On
the work of these commissions, as a whole, there is no need of
passing judgment or balancing their good and their evil. Suf-
fice it to say that they have too often proved a wholly extra-
neous element in the development of the law; and that in
assuming quasi-judicial functions they have antagonized the
courts instead of helping them. As a matter of principle, the
attempt to supplement courts by commissions, involving as it
does a separation of the progressive from the conservative, of
the technically instructed from the legally instructed, is ques-
tionable in theory and likely to produce conflicts in practice.
As a matter of political experience I think it is safe to say
that technically trained commissions have proved themselves
more valuable as assistants to the legislature or the adminis-
tration than as supplements to the activity of the courts.
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But why did not this conservatism of the courts give the
economists all the greater opportunity to influence the legis-
lature, either directly or through legislative commissions? If
the courts became the exponents of precedent, why could not
Parliaments, with the assistance of just such commissions as
have been described, be the champions of progress? Was there
not here a field for the activity of economic experts, who, see-
ing farther than their fellows, could give advice which should
be followed and should stand? As economists lost the chance
to influence judicial decisions, were they not face to face with
a wider field for influencing legislative debates?
For the better part of a century this possibility existed. In
fact, it may have been said to have lasted nearly as long as leg-
islative debate itself lasted. But the days of legislative debate
are numbered, if, indeed, they are not already ended. Con-
gresses and Parliaments have been compelled to abandon their
watchword of free speech and to adopt in one form or another the
principle of closure. The system of representative government
devised originally as a check upon the administration, and
admirable as a means of giving free discussion to measures of
a more or less independent administration, has not proved
equally successful as a means of discussing actual business in
its initiative stages. "Armies," says Macaulay, "have won
victories under bad generals, but no army ever won a victory
under a debating society." For the actual conduct of public
business the legislature is at once an unwieldy and irresponsi-
ble body.. It is so, in the first place, on account of its numbers.
When the object of a Parliament was to form and impress
public opinion, a large body of members was indispensable.
When the object is to manage thbe actual business of govern-
ment intelligently, numbers are a hindrance rather than a help.
The difficulty is heightened by the prevalence of the bicameral
system. When the object was the creation of public sentiment,
two houses secured twice as much publicity. When the object
is dispatch of public business, two houses result in divided
responsibility, with all the consequent delay and chicane. And
finally, the system of district representation, at first admirable
as a means of representing all the different sections of the com-
munitr, becomes under the new conditions a positive disadvan-
tage. In the creation of public sentiment, it gave us an
exchange of opinions; in the dispatch of public business it
means exchange of favors. Instead of co-operation in the gen-
eral interests we have log-rolling for particular interests.
Under the current system of political ethics there is in fact a
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direct antagonism between the theory of economics and the
practical working of representative government. The economist
shows how largely the independent action of the parts may be
made to conduce to the collective good of the whole. The prac-
tical working of representative government, making each mem-
ber primarily responsible to his district-or one might better say
to the members of his own party in his district-means that the
collective action of the whole is made a means to fulfil the
separate wants of the parts, even though the satisfaction of
those wants may antagonize the general interest of the nation.
The history of every tariff bill and of every river and harbor
bill affords illustrations of this tendency of our representative
system. The economist is at a disadvantage in influencing
members of the legislature, because his ends are different from
theirs. He is trying to pursue collective interests; they are
trying-and under the existing condition of things, necessarily
trying-to balance, to compromise, or in some fashion to recon-
cile divergent ones.
This difference of aims, which puts the economist at a dis-
advantage in dealing with the legislature, ought apparently to
put him at a corresponding advantage in advising the execu-
tive. For the head of the executive department, be he wise or
unwise, disinterested or self-seeking, nevertheless regards him-
self as a representative of the whole people rather than of small
sections of the people. It would seem that such an executive,
on whom the nation relies for progress in the face of judicial
conservatism, and for wise collective action in the face of legis-
lative particularism, would feel more than ever the need of ad-
vice from trained economists to guide him in the work of
administration. That such need exists and is felt is unques-
tionably true; and where the administration has power to carry
out a policy of its own the advice of economic experts is habit-
ually sought and frequently followed. But it is not always the
case that the administration has this power to carry out a policy
of its own. For centuries we have been busy devising constitu-
tional checks of the royal prerogative. We have had so much
reason to fear usurpations of power on the part of the executive
that we have not left him that modicum of power which is
needed for good government. If he has to face an adverse
majority in the legislature he is tied hand and foot. If his own
party controls the legislature he must consult the representa-
tives of the various districts and pay the price which they exact
for supporting his measures; and he is too often reduced to the
yet more questionable expedient of seeking support for his re-
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nomination and re-election in. order to have time to give his
policy a fair trial. Under such circumstances he is often com-
pelled to be a politician first and a statesman afterward. How-
ever much he may desire the advice of economists and even avail
himself of their services, he is frequently bereft of the power
to utilize them; and it too often happens that the economists, in
their encouragement of independent voting on each national
issue as it arises, deprive themselves of that influence within
the party councils which is necessary for carrying any issue
whatsoever to its logical test and conclusion.
But things are by no means at their worst. On the contrary,
if we compare the conditions of to-day with those of thirty
years ago, we see an increase of economic methods and economic
influence in some parts of the work of government. Particu-
larly true is this in municipal affairs. It was there that the
need for a good business administration came most directly
home to the citizens. It is there that councilmen and alder-
men have suffered restrictions of their power and that
real authority has been given to the executive. It is there
that the credit for good business management and the discredit
for bad business management can be more clearly brought
home to the official with whom it belongs. And it is there, also,
that the advice of economic experts counts for most. It is not
an accident that so much of the careful study of problems of
finance and administration is to-day dealing, with matters of
municipal government; it is a consequence of that increased
centralization of administrative power which gives the expert
a fair chance. But the reform is not likely to stop at that
point. Whatever we may think of imperialism as a sentiment
or of national expansion as a policy-and I was one of those
who looked upon them with regret-these are things to which
we are already committed. This policy brings new problems of
administration upon us as a nation, and renders it more neces-
sary than before to study the art of national government.
When we were only governing ourselves we could leave Con-
gress to make what laws it pleased, and trust to the good sense
and political education of the American people to prevent
irreparable damage. But we now have to deal with peoples
who have not this good sense and this political education.
More than that, we have to deal with them in the sight of all
the world, and in the face of hostile powers who will be only
too ready to make our misgovernment a pretext for interfer-
ence. We can no longer content ourselves with the laxness of
method which has characterized our dealings with the inhabit-
ants of our western territories.
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The need of an efficient army will of itself compel our peo-
ple to give more independence to the administration and moie
opportunity to its expert advisers. The need for a government
of our new colonies which shall recognize the principle of trus-
teeship rather than of spoliation must conduce yet more
strongly toward the same result. The need of increased public
revenue to meet our larger administrative expenditures will
render it necessary to subordinate the demands of the several
districts to the general necessities of the country. With no
colonies and a small army we could do what we pleased with
our revenue bills. With larger possessions and larger necessi-
ties for defense, they must be framed by a responsible adminis-
tration on a sound economic basis.
Just how this change of governmental methods will come
about no one can venture to predict. That we shall adopt the
English system of cabinet responsibility seems unlikely; but
that we shall adopt some system which will cause the different
branches of our government to operate harmoniously is a fore-
gone conclusion. The alternative is national disgrace, if not
national ruin. Here is the opportunity for the younger econo-
mists of the country. If their study is worth anything it will
give them a broader range of data on which to work and a
clearer perception of consequences for the future. It will put
them in a position of advantage in giving advice. The more
responsible the government the more certain is it to take such
advice. I do not say that the opportunity to become advisers
and leaders of a national policy should be sought by econo-
mists, as their sole duty, or to the neglect of their other public
responsibilities. I do not undervalue for a moment the impor-
tance of economic theory. I have the highest conception of
the work of our economists as teachers of science. But I
believe that their largest opportunity in the immediate future
lies not in theories but in practice, not with students but with
statesmen; not in the education of individual citizens, however
widespread and salutary, but in the leadership of an organized
body politic.
ARTHUR T. HADLEY.
